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INTRODUCTION
IN the summer of 2009, the United States Bankruptcy Court in Utah was
confronted with the now common task of resolving the ownership of a
domain name.- The domain name at stake in the case of In re Paige was
freecreditscore.com, reportedly worth between $350,000 and $200 million.'
Before it reached the court, this domain name had been traded and
appropriated so many times, by so many parties, that as Judge Thurman
wrote in the court's opinion, "[t]he facts of this case . . . lend themselves
almost to mystery novel status."' Yet, at the heart of the conflict was a
seemingly simple conversion action,s wherein the bankruptcy trustee of
Paige's estate claimed that the defendants had wrongfully taken possession
and control of the domain name freecreditscore.com from Paige, its original
owner.
In unraveling the knot of the domain's ownership, the court was faced
with another issue, one the judiciary has wrestled with for more than ten
years: the exact legal status of a domain name.' Courts have been unable
i JD expected May 201I, University of Kentucky College of Law; BA in English and
Classics, May 2000, University of Kentucky. The author would like to thank his wife, Lori
Hancock, for her support and encouragement, as well as Professors Mark E Kightlinger and
Kathryn L. Moore for their assistance.
2 Jubber v. Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. (In re Paige), 413 B.R. 882, 888 (Bankr. D. Utah
2009).
3 Id. at 887-88.
4 Id. at 888-89.
5 The court defined conversion as follows:
Under Utah law, conversion is "an act of willful interference with
[property] done without lawful justification by which the person entitled
thereto is deprived of its use and possession." Although conversion
results from intentional conduct it does not require a conscious
wrongdoing, but only an intent to exercise dominion or control over the
goods inconsistent with the owner's rights. The Plaintiffs must prove all
elements of conversion by a preponderence of the evidence.
Id. at 916 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
6 Jubber, 413 B.R. at 888.
7 Id. at 917 n.168.
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to come to a consensus on how property and tort law should be analogized
and applied to digital interactions. Two precedents existed, but the Paige
court was bound by neither.' Either the domain was only a contractual right
for the domain registration and services, established by the agreements
between the registrar and the registrant, or it was intangible property.9
No matter which option the court chose, the conversion claim would be
invalid: a contract for services cannot be converted," and Utah law did not
allow a conversion claim with respect to intangible property." Intangible
property is a somewhat generic term used to denote things that can be
owned and transferred to others but that have no physical substance.12
The term includes things such as debts and other alienable obligations,
intellectual property, as well as types of data and information." State
laws vary on whether it is possible to convert intangible property without
somehow merging it into a physical form, 4 and Utah is among those that do
not allow such claims.5 Instead, the court validated the conversion claim in
the only way Utah law would allow: by determining that a domain name is,
in fact, tangible property.'
The Paige court held that a domain name is tangible property because it
can be "perceived by the senses": it has a physical presence on a computer
drive, and one can exclude others from access to it.'7 Unfortunately, the
court's argument in support of its conclusion is not persuasive, but this is
not sufficient cause to dismiss the conclusion itself. The court developed
a novel approach to domain names, and this approach has significant
advantages (which the court did not explore) over previously held views.
8 See id. at 917.
9 Id. at 917.
1o An action for conversion applies only to chattels, certain negotiable instruments, and
certain types of future interests in chattels. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 222A,
241A, 243 (1965)
iI InrePaige,413 B.R.9 16-zo.
12 Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp. v. State Bd. of Equilization, 884 P2d io8, 1no (Cal.
1994) ("Although there appears to be no comprehensive definition of intangible property,
such property is generally defined as property that is a 'right' rather than a physical object.")
(citation omitted); Norris v. Norris, 731 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Mo. 1987) ("Intangible personal
property is that which has no intrinsic and marketable value, but is merely the representative
of evidence of value, such as certificates of stock, bonds, promissory notes, and franchises.");
Adams v. Great Am. Lloyd's Ins. Co., 891 S.W2d 769, 772 (Tex. App. 1995) ("Intangible
property, on the other hand, has no physical existence but may be evidenced by a document
with no intrinsic value."); BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1253 (8th ed. 2004) ("Property that lacks
a physical existence.").
13 See, e.g., Thyroff v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 864 N.E.2d 1272, 1276-77 (N.Y. 2007).
14 Id. (comparing state applications of the merger doctrine to intangible property, par-
ticularly computer data).
15 InrePaige,413 B.R. at 916.
16 Id. at 918.
17 Id.
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This Note will explore the three ways that courts have applied existing
laws to domain names: treating the domain names as purely contractual
rights, treating them as intangible property, and treating them as tangible
property. None of these approaches are perfect. Existing tort, property, and
contract law are not equipped to conclusively address the unique issues
surrounding ownership of domain names. Of the three different views,
however, treating domain names as tangible property is the most reasonable
in light of the historical development of the doctrines of tangible and
intangible property, the apparent intent of Congress, and public policy.
Part I of this Note will explain the purpose of domain names, the relevant
technical aspects of domain name creation and administration, and the
actions Congress has taken with regard to domain-related legal claims. Part
II will review existing precedents treating domain names as service contracts
or intangible property, and will identify deficiencies in both approaches.
Part III will step through the logic of the Paige holding and identify why
the court's arguments fail to support its conclusion that a domain name
is tangible property. Part IV will examine reasons why the Paige holding
nevertheless has merit and detail the advantages that such a holding provides
by clarifying the rights of domain name owners and other interested parties.
I. DOMAIN NAMES: How THEY WORK AND How
THEY ARE AFFECTED BY STATUTES
When one registers and pays for a domain name, this seemingly simple
transaction invokes a hugely complex system of technical and contractual
coordination. The Domain Name System (DNS) is the map that brings
order to the World Wide Web-not in the sense that it categorizes or
arranges the information available on the Web-but in the sense that it
gives people a framework for interacting with that information. The DNS
is administered by hundreds of companies across millions of computers. In
addition to the technical aspects of domain name registration and use, the act
of purchasing a domain name also implicates laws governing trademark and
unfair competition. Congress has responded to these concerns by passing
laws governing what types of domain names can be registered by whom,
and providing jurisdiction for courts over domain names themselves.
A. The Domain Name System: How It Functions, How It Is Administered,
and How It Affects Users
The purpose of the DNS is to bring order to the way that computers
communicate with each other. Large networks of computers use the
Internet Protocol (IP) system, the internal organization system of the
Internet, to communicate with one another around the globe, quickly
187
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and inexpensively, over multiple physical paths." An IP address is the
numerical identifier of a particular source of data on the Internet;19 in
this sense, it works similarly to longitude and latitude coordinates for
locating a physical place. Computers use these IP addresses to route
information and establish connections among themselves;z0 however,
the IP system is too complex for humans to interact with directly.'
The DNS provides an interface to the IP system that is more accessible
to humans, but the two are separate in terms of legal status and operation.
IP addresses cannot be owned, but are disseminated through an "address
lending" method to provide for future changes and expansion.2 2 A single IP
address can be assigned to multiple domain names, 23 and a single domain
name for a major website can point to a cluster of IP addresses, any of
which may or may not be valid at a given time due to location, load, and
security concerns.24
The DNS is distributed through millions of machines throughout
the world, yet in function, it acts as a single database. A domain name is
organized as a hierarchy. For example, in the domain name maps.google.
com, ".com" is the top-level domain (TLD), "google" is the second-level,
or enterprise-level domain, and "maps" is the third-level domain." Each
TLD, such as .com, .org, or .gov, is administered by a single entity; for
instance, the .com TLD is administered by VeriSign Global Registry
Services.27 There are over seventy-seven million enterprise-level domains
18 Glossary, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/general/glossaryhtm (last modified Aug.
13, 2010).
19 Id.
20 Stephen M. Ryan, Raymond A. Plzak & John Curran, Legaland Policy Aspects of Internet
Number Resources, 24 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 335, 336 (2oo8).
21 See id. at 338-39.
22 Id. at 340-41 (citation omitted).
23 For instance, multiple domain names can refer to the same website on a single server.
Seeid. at 339. Also, it's possible for one computer with a single IP address to host multiple web-
sites owned and operated by different entities. See Name-based Virtual Host Support, APACHE,
http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.o/vhosts/name-based.html (last visited Aug. 26, 2ol o).
24 E.g., Luiz Andr6 Barroso, Jeffrey Dean & Urs Hblzle, Web Searchfora Planet: The Google
Cluster Architecture, IEEE M Icno, Mar.-Apr. 2003, at 22, 23, available at http://labs.google.
com/papers/googlecluster-ieee.pdf (describing the user advantages of Google's complex IP-
clustering service).
25 Catherine T. Struve & R. Polk Wagner, Realspace Sovereigns in Cyberspace. Problems with
the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 989, 1 oI9-20 (2002).
26 Ramaswamy Chandramouli & Scott Rose, US DEP'T OF COMMERCE, NIST SPECIAL
PUB. 800-8iri, SECURE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM (DNS) DEPLOYMENT GUIDE: RECOMMENDATIONS
OF THE NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF STANDARDS AND TECHNOLOGY 2-2 (2009), available at http:/lcsrc.
nist.gov/publications/drafts/8oo-8 1-rev I/nist draft-sp8oo-8I r -round2.pdf.
27 VeriSign Internet Infrastructure: An Overview, VERISIGN 5 (Oct. 26, 2007), https://www.
verisign.com/corporate/internet-infrastructure-overview.pdf.
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registered in the .com TLD alone .2 The Internet Corporation for Assigned
Names and Numbers (ICANN), a nonprofit corporation established by the
United States Department of Commerce in 1998, assigns and coordinates
management of each TLD.2 1 ICANN is also responsible for accrediting
registrars, companies that are authorized to sell domain names to end-
users.30 These registrars must coordinate their sales with the manager of
each TLD (e.g., VeriSign for .com domains) both to verify that a name is
available and to register it once a user has purchased it The manager
of the TLD then adds the new registration to its database and publishes
it to the DNS.32 When a user types a domain name into a web browser,
the browser queries the DNS to find the IP address associated with that
domain.33 Enterprise-level domains are the focus of the controversies in the
cases discussed in this Note.
B. The Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act and the
Utah E-Commerce Integrity Act
From a registrant's, or buyer's, standpoint, domain registrations for
enterprise-level domains are performed on a first come, first served
basis." Before 1999, an entity had no automatic right to a domain name if
another registered it first, regardless of whether the domain in question
was the company's name, trademark, or even a personal name. 5 In 1999, in
response to growing concern about protection of trademark rights in domain
names, 6 Congress passed the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act (ACPA)3 7 ACPA creates a federal cause of action for the owner of a
trademark if a person "registers, traffics in," or uses in "bad faith" a domain
name that is "confusingly similar to that mark."" The statute allows a court
28 Chandramouli & Rose, supra note 26.
29 Id. at 2-3.
30 Information for Registrars and Registrants, ICANN, http://www, .icann.org/en/registrars/
(last visited Sept. 12, 20 10).
31 Chandramouli & Rose, supra note 26, at 2-3.
3 2 Id.
33 Id. at 2-4.
34 Michael P. Allen, In Rem Jurisdiction from Pennover to Shaffer to the Anticybersquatting
Consumer Protection Act, II GEO. MASON L. REV. 243, 250 (2002) (citation omitted).
35 See id. at 251-52 & nn-50-51.
36 See S. REP. No. io6-140, at 7-8 (1999) ("Legislation is needed to address these problems
and to protect consumers, promote the continued growth of electronic commerce, and protect
the goodwill of American businesses. Specifically, legislation is needed to clarify the rights of
trademark owners with respect to bad faith, abusive domain name registration practices, to
provide clear deterrence to prevent bad faith and abusive conduct, and to provide adequate
remedies for trademark owners in those cases where it does occur.").
37 Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § I I25(d) (2006).
38 Id. § Ii 25(d)(i)(A)(ii). The definition of "domain name" in the ACPA applies only to
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to order the "forfeiture or cancellation of the domain name or the transfer
of the domain name to the owner of the mark."3 9 Ordinarily, a trademark
owner would bring an in personam action against the offending registrants.
If the mark owner is unable to obtain in personam jurisdiction, however,
ACPA also provides for an in rem action against the domain name itself.40
The action in rem is brought to determine ownership of the domain name
and the rights of parties and all other persons with regard to it.4 1 An in rem
action under ACPA must be brought in the jurisdiction where the registrar
or registry is located. 42 In such cases, ACPA empowers the court to direct an
order of forfeiture, cancellation, or transfer to the registrar of the offending
domain, bypassing the domain name owner entirely. ACPA provides for
civil penalties for registrars that fail to comply with such an order.43 The
statute also provides some protection for domain owners against bad faith
lawsuits by trademark holders."
In February 2010, Utah became the first state to pass its own version
of ACPA, the Utah E-Commerce Integrity Act ("Utah Act").45 The Utah
Act provides, in addition to causes of action for phishing and pharming,4 6
for in rem jurisdiction similar to that provided by ACPA over domain
names in cybersquatting cases.4 The Utah Act, however, requires the
domain owner to be located in the state, even for in rem actions against
the domain name itself.49 Given this unusual limitation, 4 9 it is not clear
whether plaintiffs will find much use in the act's in rem jurisdictional
grant. The act also extends anticybersquatting protections beyond
ACPA to personal names that are not trademarks;so however, it provides
no protection, as ACPA does, for bad faith lawsuits by trademark owners
against lawfully registered domains." Whether the Utah statute will
second-level domains, i.e., names registered with a domain name registrar and not to names
of files, web pages, or email addresses. 2 ANNE GILSoN LALONDE, GILSON ON TRADEMARKS §
7A.o6(I][al (2010).
39 15 U.S.C. § I125(d)(i)(C).
40 Id. § III 25 (d)(2)(A).
41 See BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 13 (3d pocket ed. 2oo6).
42 15 U.S.C. § I I25(d)(2)(A); see also LALONDE,Supra note 38, at § 7A.o6[I[e][ii] (2010).
43 15 U.S.C. § i12 5 (d)(2)(D)(i).
44 See id. § II25(d)(i)(B)(ii).
45 UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-40-101 (West, Westlaw through 2oIo Sess.).
46 Id. § 13-40-201.
47 See id. § 70-3a-309(2)(a).
48 Id.
49 Generally, actions in rem are concerned only with the property or thing at issue and are
unconcerned with the location of the property's registered owner. See, e.g., Combs v. Combs,
60 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Ky. 1933) ("[A] proceeding strictly in rem is one against the thing itself
with no cognizance taken of its owner or persons having a beneficial interest in it ...
50 § 70-3a-309.
51 See id. Contra 15 U.S.C.A. § I I25(c)(16) (West 2oo9).
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encourage other states to pass similar legislation is yet to be determined.
Congress has granted property status to domain names only with regard
to trademark infringement actions." However, Congress has not spoken
directly on the question of whether a domain name is or can be property
that might be converted or garnished by a party other than the registrant,
registrar, or proper trademark holder. Such a determination has been left to
the market and the courts.
11. CONFLICTING PRECEDENTS ON DETERMINING
THE STATUS OF DOMAIN NAMES
Sir Tim Berners-Lee, inventor of the protocols underlying the World
Wide Web," recently described the DNS as "the Achilles heel of the
Web."" He was criticizing ICANN's ownership and administration of the
DNS,55 but his comments could apply equally well to courts' uncertain and
inconsistent approaches to legal issues surrounding domain names. Any
discussion of domain names necessarily involves complex explanations
of technological issues, and courts strive to analogize these issues to
fit within existing tort, property, and contract law frameworks. During
twenty years of disputes over domain names, two opposing views have
taken hold in various courts. The minority view is that domain names
are primarily rights created by and bound to service contracts. The
majority view is that domain names are a new type of intangible property.
A. Domain Names as Primarily Contractual Rights:
Network Solutions v. Umbro
The first of the two prevailing views on the status of a domain name
originated in Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro International, Inc., a case from
the Supreme Court of Virginia in 2000.16 Umbro International won a default
judgment and permanent injunction against 3263851 Canada, Inc. regarding
the domain name umbro.com." In its attempt to enforce the judgment,
Umbro began a garnishment proceeding against Network Solutions to
recover thirty-eight domain names (including umbro.com) that Canada, Inc.
52 J uliet M. Moringiello, Seizing Domain Names to Enforce Judgments: Looking Back to Look
to the Future, 72 U. CIN. L. REV- 95, 123 (2003).
53 Victoria Shannon, Pioneer Who Kept the Web Free Honored with a Technology Prize, N.Y.
TIMES, June 14, 2004, at C 4 .
54 Isn't it Semantic?, BCS (Mar. 2oo6), http://www.bcs.org/
serverphp?show=conWebDoc.3337.
55 Id.
56 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d 80 (Va. 2000).
57 Id. at 8 I.
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had registered." Network Solutions responded that the domain names were
not garnishable property and characterized them as only "'standardized,
executory service contracts' or 'domain name registration agreements."'5 9
The court adopted Network Solutions's theory that a domain name is
'simply a reference point in a computer database . . . [or a] vernacular
shorthand for the registration services that enable the Internet addressing
system to recognize a particular domain name as a valid address."' 60
Therefore, whether a domain name is property or is not property is
irrelevant to determining the rights a registrant holds because those
rights are defined by the contract between the registrant and registrar.6'
The court reasoned that any rights that Canada, Inc. might have had in
the domain names could not be separated from the technical services
provided by Network Solutions.62 Under this same rationale, the court
sidestepped the issue of whether a domain name is a form of intangible
property, despite Network Solutions' own acknowledgement during oral
argument that domain names are a form of intangible property.63 A domain
name, the court held, is solely a right granted under a contract for services
between the registrant and the registrar, and a contract for services is not
a "liability" as defined by the Virginia garnishment statutes.' Because
Virginia law only allows for garnishment of "liabilities," a domain name is
not a form of property subject to garnishment or sheriff's sale.6 s Following
this analysis, the court buttressed its holding with a floodgates argument
that allowing garnishment-type actions against this kind of service contract
would support other attempts to seize service contracts outside the context
of domain names, a result the court clearly wished to avoid.'
Umbro is often cited for the proposition that a domain name is simply
a contractual arrangement and therefore cannot be a property right. 67
This assertion is a misreading of the case. The Virginia Supreme Court
purposely did not consider whether a domain name should be considered a
type of property." Rather, it declared that a domain name contract was not a
58 Id.
59 Id. (citation omitted).
60 Id. at 85 (alternation in original) (citation omitted).





66 Id. at 86-87.
67 E.g., Office Depot, Inc. v. Zuccarini, 621 F. Supp. 2d 773, 777 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 2007);
Alexis Freeman, Internet Domain Name Security Interests: Why Debtors Can Grant Them and
Lenders Can Take Them in this New Type of Hybrid Property, to Ast. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 853, 859-
6o (2002); Warren E. Agin, I'm a Domain Name. What Am I? Making Sense of Kremen v. Cohen.,
14 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 73, 77 (2005).
68 Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86; see also Moringiello, supra note 52, at io8.
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"liability" under the garnishment statute.mThe court briefly acknowledged
the argument that ACPA's in rem provisions could support an understanding
of domain names as intangible property but did not follow the argument
because ACPA does not address the contractual aspect of domain names
with which the court was concerned.70
While the Umbro holding does "provide[] a consistent and structurally
simple framework for determining issues surrounding domain names"
in grounding them within the well-defined realm of contract law, 7 it
creates more problems than it solves. First, it complicates the relationship
between the registrant, who is tinder the impression he has purchased the
domain and now "owns" it, and the registrar, who dictates all terms of the
arrangement. 2 These terms are far from universal. As of 2009, there were
several hundred individually-ICANN-accredited registrars, many of which
are outside the United States, each of which has its own possibly unique
contract provisions with registrants. 73 Many of these agreements, including
Network Solutions' own service agreement, include terms that specifically
restrict a registrant's right to transfer or resell the domain, though these terms
are generally not enforced. 74 By the terms of these agreements, domain
names are not accessible to creditors; for instance, the Network Solutions
service agreement provides that any attempt by a creditor to gain rights in a
domain name through judicial processes gives Network Solutions the right
to cancel the domain name outright, thus depriving both the owner and
the creditor of its potential value.' Therefore, this view of domain names
as strictly contractual rights does not fit with the way domain names are
actually traded in practice.
Second, the court's arguments analogizing a domain name contract
to other service contracts ignore the special circumstances surrounding
domain names. The court compares the domain name service contract to a
contract for satellite television service, and states that allowing garnishment
of a domain name would open the door to garnishment of a user's television
69 Moringiello, supra note 52, at io8.
70 Umbro, 529 S.E.2d at 86 n.12.
71 Agin, supra note 67, at 77.
72 Id.
73 Information for Registrars and Registrants, ICANN, http://www.icann.org/en/registrars/
(last modified Aug. 13, 20i0).
74 Agin, supra note 67, at 79-80 ("In short, under the 'contract' theory a domain name
registered with Network Solutions is not clearly transferable as a matter of law (although it is
transferable as a matter of practice).... While, in practice, Network Solutions may never have
exercised its ability to terminate a domain name under this Section 20, the legal reality is that
under the 'contract' theory, a Network Solutions domain name is not freely transferable.");
see Service Agreement § 20, NETWORK SoLuTIONs, http://www.networksolutions.com/legal/static-
service-agreement.jsp (last visited Aug. 24, 20io).
75 Moringiello, supra note 52, at 103; see also Service Agreement, supra note 74, § 20.
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service for nonpayment. 6 This ignores the independent value that domain
names have found on the secondary market. It is possible to sell a domain
name on the secondary market for substantial profit.n The same is not true
of a contract for television service. Also, a domain name can encapsulate or
infringe upon trademarks or copyrights in a way that other service contracts
cannot. This independent value and the possibility for infringement drive
conflicts over domain names, and by attempting to reduce a domain name
to a service contract, the Umbro court failed to address these concerns.
B. Domain Names as Intangible Property: Kremen v. Cohen
The majority view of domain names is that they are intangible property,
separate from the contractual services that allow them to function. Congress
impliedly supported this view in the ACPA's grant of in rem jurisdiction to
domain name trademark-infringement actions.7 ' This view is illustrated by
the opinion of the Ninth Circuit in Kremen v. Cohen, where a dispute arose
over the domain name sex.com.79
Stephen Cohen illegally obtained ownership of the sex.com domain
from Network Solutions, who transferred it to him from Gary Kremen, the
rightful owner.80 After Kremen obtained a judgment against Cohen, Kremen
76 Network Solutions, Inc. v. Umbro Int'l, Inc., 529 S.E.2d So, 87 (Va. 2000).
77 See Jothan Frakes, Domain Name Secondary Market: What Makes a Name Worth
Thousands of Dollars and How Does This Market Work?, ICANN Meetings in Lisbon,
Portugal (Mar. 25, 2007), http://www.icann.org/en/meetings/lisbon/transcript-tutorial-second-
ary-25maro7.htm.
78 Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3d 248, 260 (4th Cir. 2002) ("Congress
plainly treated domain names as property in the ACPA....").
79 Seegenerally Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F.3d 1024 (9th Cir. 2oo3).
So Id. at 1026-27. Kremen registered the domain name sex.com in 1994 to his business,
Online Classifieds. Id. at 1026. Cohen, a con man, forwarded a letter to Network Solutions
in which Online Classifieds claimed to have dismissed Kremen, and to have abandoned the
domain. Id. The letter further reported that Online Classifieds, not having an Internet connec-
tion, was requesting Cohen to contact Network Solutions on its behalf to transfer ownership
of the domain to him. Id. at 1026-27. Network Solutions complied, making no attempt to
contact Kremen. Id. at 1027. Cohen then made tremendous profits off the sex.com domain. Id.
Kremen obtained a judgment against Cohen in district court for $65 million in compensatory
and punitive damages, but Cohen ignored the court's order to freeze his assets and transferred
them to offshore accounts. Id. Cohen even stripped his real estate of everything, including fix-
tures, and did not answer a court order to show cause why he should not be held in contempt.
Id. The judge declared him a fugitive from justice. Id. Kremen then took matters into his
own hands when he offered a $5o,ooo reward for Cohen's capture on the sex.com homepage;
Cohen fled to Mexico, where his lawyers claimed that "gunfights between Mexican authori-
ties and would-be bounty hunters seeking Kremen's reward money posed a threat to human
life." Id. Cohen was finally arrested in 2005 on immigration charges by Mexican authorities
in Tijuana and transferred to United States custody. Kieren McCarthy, Sex.com ThiefArrested:
Stephen Cohen Nabbed After Five Years on the Run, THE REGISTER (Oct. 28, 2005), http://www.
theregister.co.uk/2005/1o/28/sexdotcom-cohen-arrested/.
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was unable to enforce it because Cohen may have fled the country.,' In
Cohen's absence, Kremen sued Network Solutions for breach of contract
and conversion."' The district court was reluctant to impose "the archaic
principles governing the tort of conversion onto the nebulous realm of the
Internet,"" recognizing that such a decision was perhaps better left to the
legislature.8 4 However, the district court and the Ninth Circuit agreed that
Kremen's breach of contract claims were groundless, for he in fact had no
contract with Network Solutions." Kremen had registered the domain
before Network Solutions had begun charging for registrations; therefore,
the contract was invalid for lack of consideration.8
Because there was no contract between Kremen and Network Solutions,
the court was not in a position to consider the Umbro reasoning regarding
the contractual services behind a domain name. Instead, it seized upon
Network Solutions' acknowledgement in Umbro that registrants have a
property right in their domain names." Following California law, the court
applied a three-part test to determine whether a property right existed in a
domain name:
First, there must be an interest capable of precise definition; second, it
must be capable of exclusive possession or control; and third, the putative
owner must have established a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Domain
names satisfy each criterion. Like a share of corporate stock or a plot of
land, a domain name is a well-defined interest. Someone who registers a
domain name decides where on the Internet those who invoke that par-
ticular name-whether by typing it into their web browsers, by follow-
ing a hyperlink, or by other means-are sent. Ownership is exclusive in
that the registrant alone makes that decision. Noreover, like other forms
of property, domain names are valued, bought and sold, often for mil-
lions of dollars, and they are now even subject to in rem jurisdiction.
Finally, registrants have a legitimate claim to exclusivity. Registering
a domain name is like staking a claim to a plot of land at the title office. It
informs others that the domain name is the registrant's and no one else's."
Under this rationale, the court concluded that Kremen had an intangible
property right in his domain name and a colorable claim for conversion."
Treating domain names as a form of intangible property has implications
that work both to the advantage and disadvantage of domain owners. If a
81 See Kremen, 337 Fd at 1027.
82 Id. at 1027-28.
83 Kremen v. Cohen (Kremen 1), 99 F. Supp. 2d i168, 1174 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
84 Moringiello, supra note 52, at 125.
85 Kremen, 337 F3 d at 1029.
86 Id.
87 Id.




domain name is intangible property, its owner can sidestep the problems
created by inconsistent contractual agreements between multiple registrars
as property status grants the owner well-defined rights that are more in line
with his expectations.9 0 It allows for some degree of consistency of legal
treatment of domain names between state courts in actions for conversion
and federal courts under the in rem provisions of ACPA." On the other
hand, this view of a domain as intangible property could be purposefully
used to override the contractual obligations of a registrant or registrar, and
it also makes the domain an asset that creditors or others may attach or
garnish without permission of the domain owner.
In assuming without question that the property right in a domain name
was in fact intangible, the court created another problem. The Restatement
(Second) of Torts, in section 242, addresses conversion actions for intangible
property and provides:
(1) Where there is conversion of a document in which intangible rights are
merged, the damages include the value of such rights.
(2) One who effectively prevents the exercise of intangible rights of the
kind customarily merged in a document is subject to a liability similar to
that for conversion, even though the document is not itself converted. 2
A strict application of the Restatement precludes a conversion action for
intangible property that is not "customarily merged in a document."" While
the Kremen court found that this merger requirement had not been adopted
in California, and thus was not a bar to its holding,94 it addressed the merger
requirement in dicta, agreeing with Kremen that a domain name is indeed
merged in a document:
We agree that the DNS is a document (or perhaps more accurately a col-
lection of documents). That it is stored in electronic form rather than
on ink and paper is immaterial. It would be a curious jurisprudence
that turned on the existence of a paper document rather than an elec-
tronic one. Torching a company's file room would then be conver-
sion while hacking into its mainframe and deleting its data would not.
States that follow the Restatement's approach have not accepted this
90 Agin, supra note 67, at 79-80.
9 1 See id. at 82.
92 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFTORTS § 242 (1965) (emphasis added).
93 Id. 242(2).
94 Kremen, 337 F.3 d at 1033 ("In short, California does not follow the Restatement's strict
requirement that some document must actually represent the owner's intangible property
right. On the contrary, courts routinely apply the tort to intangibles without inquiring whether
they are merged in a document and, while it's often possible to dream up some document
the intangible is connected to in some fashion, it's seldom one that represents the owner's
property interest.").
95 Id. at 1033-34 (internal citations omitted).
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view.9 6 The United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas,
in Emke v. Compana, L.L.C, chose to apply California law to a similar con-
version action in 2007 because neither of the other viable choices, Texas
or Nevada law, would allow for conversion of intangible property of this
type.97 The court held that "[t]o hold otherwise would encourage ... cy-
bersquatters ... to reside and operate in states, such as Texas, where intan-
gible intellectual property receives little or no protection from a conversion
claim."" As demonstrated by this line of reasoning, the problems with the
Kremen holding do not stem from the domain name system itself, but from
the tort law of the states.
III. A CURIOUS JURISPRUDENCE: IV RE PAIGE
The bankruptcy court in Paige faced an issue similar to that in Kremen.
Steve Paige registered freecreditscore.com in his own name with Network
Solutions in May 2000.9 Paige entered into multiple business ventures
between 2002 and 2005 with different partners, doing business primarily
as CCS, LLC.'00 Over the course of these partnerships, the various
contract assignments for the domain name were changed from Paige to
his business partners, though Paige remained the registered owner. 1 In
June 2005, the registrant changed to Randy Conklin, who was tinder the
impression that he was holding the domain for Paige.' 02 Paige filed for
bankruptcy in September 2005 but did not list the domain name among
his assets."' Over the next two years, Paige entered into negotiations to
sell the domain to Stephen May.'04 Unbeknownst to Paige, a third party,
doing business as Promarketing, obtained ownership of the domain
name and later sold it to May.'05 Gary Jubber, the liquidating trustee in
Paige's bankruptcy, brought a conversion action against May and the other
involved parties in order to recover the domain name for Paige's estate. 0 6
Jubber urged the court to accept the Kremen view and thereby validate the
96 See, e.g., Emke v. Compana, L.L.C., No. 3:o6-C\- 1416-L, 2007 WIL 2781661, at *3
(N.D. Tex. Sept. 25, 2007) (finding that Texas conversion law applies only to physical prop-
crty).
97 Id. at #4, *5.
98 Id. at #5-
99 Jubber v. Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. (In re Paige), 413 B.R. 882, 888 (Bankr. D. Utah
2009).
too Id. at 889-90.
ioi Id. at 89o-9i.
102 Id. at 89j.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 892.
105 Id. at 896-99.
io6 Id. at 899.
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estate's conversion claim."o' The defendants pushed their view of Umbro,
which specified that a domain name was purely a contractual right, not
a property right, a conclusion that would invalidate the estate's claim. 1 s
A. A Domain Name Is Tangible Property?
The Paige court declined to define the domain name as either a purely
contractual arrangement or as intangible property.'"0 The court relied in
part upon the Supreme Court's ruling in Butner v. United States, which
mandated that bankruptcy courts defer to state property laws."o Because
the conclusions in Umbro and Kremen were based on applications of Virginia
and California law, respectively, and because Utah had not adopted the
same property law principles as either of those states, the court declined to
apply either view to the facts at hand."' In a footnote, the court dismissed
the Umbro view in responding to the defendants' assertion that Virginia
law should apply under the choice of law provisions in the service contract:
"[tihis would be the case if the Court were to find that domain name rights
are contract rights and, therefore, governed by the Network Solutions
service agreement, which the Court does not.""I2 The court did not further
explain why it dismissed the idea of a domain name as a contract right. The
only reason given by the Paige court to explain its dismissal of Kremen's
holding was simply that a domain name is intangible property and that
"Utah does not appear to have followed the same path as California on this
issue.""3
Instead, the court relied on a June 2009 decision of the United
States District Court for the District of Utah in Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link
Technologies, LLC."4 InMargae, the court was asked to determine the property
status of a website for purposes of a conversion action."' Utah law, which
follows the Restatement (Second) of Torts," 6 restricts claims for conversion of
intangible property to "intangible rights of the kind customarily merged in
a document.""I The Margae court held that because it was "not customary"
for a website to be merged in a document, unlike a stock certificate or
107 Id. at 916.
io8 Id. at 917.
109 Id. at 917 & n.168.
i io Id. at 917 n.169 (citing Butner v. United States, 44o U.S. 48, 55 (1979)) ("Property
interests are created and defined by state law.").
Iii Id. at 917.
112 Id. at917n.168.
113 Id. at917.
114 Id.; see Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284 (D. Utah 2009).
i15 Alargae, 62o F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
116 Id.
117 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 242(2) (1965).
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promissory note, Utah law would not allow for conversion of a website as
intangible property."' The court found the possibility of printing out a
website to be insignificant, and it is not clear from the court's explanation
whether it considered a merger in digital documents in its analysis." 9
The plaintiff's claim, however, was not altogether defeated. The Margae
court took the unusual step of declaring that tinder Utah law, a web page
was tangible property.2 The court held that like software
a web page has a physical presence on [sic] computer drive, causes tangible
effects on computers, and can be perceived by the senses.... Further, web
pages can be physically altered by authorized users and access to web pages
can be physically restricted by the use of passwords and other security
measures.1'2
The court also emphasized the "distinction between the information
displayed on the web page, which is intangible, and the web page itself,
which acts as the medium for transmitting the information," and compared
both to a memorized song, that it characterized as "truly intangible"
property."' Because the defendant had deprived Margac of access to the
web page, and because a web page was tangible property, the court held
that Margae's conversion claim was valid under Utah law. 2
The Paige court adopted the reasoning from Alargae in holding that
domain names were also tangible property; the court asserted that
"domain names can be perceived by the senses and access to them
can be physically restricted by the use of passwords and other security
measures." '24 The ability to exclude others from access seemed to be
the key to the court's reasoning, as the court specifically referred to the
trustee being "locked out" of the domain. 2 ' The court invoked Margae's
memorized song analogy, stating that "unlike a mere idea that can only
be stored in a person's mind, domain names can and do have a physical
presence on a computer drive."' 2 6 Based on this finding that a domain
i18 Alargae, 62o F. Supp. 2d at 1287.
1 19 Id.
120 Id. at 1287-88; see also Conwell v. Gray Loon Outdoor Mktg. Grp., 906 N.E.2d 805,
812 (Ind. 2009); cf Soverain Software L.L.C. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 383 F Supp. 2d 904, 909
(E.D. Tex. 2005) (holding that a website is tangible property for purposes of a patent marking
statute, where the court defined tangible items as things that can be marked with a patent
notice, and intangible items as things that cannot be marked).
2 i Alargae, 62o F. Supp. 2d. at i288 (citing S. Cent. Utah Tel. Ass'n v. Auditing Div., 951
P2d 218, 223-24 (Utah 1997) (finding software to be tangible property)).
I22 Id.
123 Id






name is tangible property, the court went on to find that conversion
had taken place and ordered the domain turned over to the trustee.'
B. But Does the Paige Court's Reasoning Make Sense?
While a bankruptcy court's ruling is not binding on other courts, the
Paige court's holding adds a new voice to the long-running discussion of
the nature of domain names and how they fit into existing conceptions
of property. Unfortunately, the reasoning it shares with Margae betrays a
misunderstanding of the nature of the technology at issue. The Margae
court found that a website is tangible property because it has physical
presence on a disk drive, it can be perceived by the senses, and it is
possible for its owner to exclude others from it.128 The Paige court
imported this reasoning directly into its opinion without considering
whether the analogy between websites and domain names is appropriate.
Domain names and websites are interrelated, but they are by no means
inseparable. Just as a call number in a library catalog is not a book itself,
a domain name is not a website. The two are independent entities with
different underlying technologies. A website is a collection of data files
which can be stored on a single hard drive in a single computer."' Each
of these files is uniquely identifiable, and apart from having a "physical
presence""o on the drive, each file can be separately edited, saved, copied,
and otherwise used as an independent component part of the website.13 1
A website as a whole may be a complex configuration of these different
files and data that are reliant upon server software,"' but each aspect of
it is usually under the control of the creator of the website. As long as
one has the appropriate server software, these files can be viewed offline,
individually, or in tandem, and they are not governed by sophisticated
contractual or technical arrangements like the DNS. While the Margae
court mentioned the Restatement's merger requirement in its opinion,
it did not follow through in analyzing websites under the doctrine as
the Kremen court did. 33 Had it done so, it easily could have found that a
website, being a collection of electronic documents, indeed satisfied the
127 Id. at 919.
128 Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1288 (D. Utah 2009).
129 There are websites where files are distributed between many computers, but they
are the exception rather than the norm. See Barroso et al., supra note 24, at 22.
130 Margae, 62o F. Supp. 2d at 1288.
131 See Dave Raggett, GettingStartedrwith HTML,W3C, http://www.w3.org/MarkUpGuide/
(last updated May 24, 2005).
132 Such server software can be run on a web developer's individual computer as easily
as on a dedicated webserver. See, e.g., About the Apache H7P Server Project, APACHE, http://
httpd.apache.org/ABOUTAPACHE.html (last visited Aug 29, 2010).
133 Margae, 620 F. Supp. 2d at 1287-88.
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Restatement's requirement that intangible property be merged in a document.
A domain name, on the other hand, encapsulates a complex interaction
between different computers and different organizations, from ICANN all
the way to the registrant and end user. It is a distributed database, and no
one computer contains more than a small portion of it. A domain name
cannot function without this online context, and is functionally dependent
on it. In this respect, the Umbro court was correct-a domain name cannot
be separated from the services of the registrar, the TLD administrator,
and the DNS as a whole-regardless of whether a contract exists between
the registrant and registrar. Also, it is incorrect to treat a domain name as
a document. While the Kremen court did find, in dicta, that the DNS is
a document for purposes of the Restatement's merger requirement, it is
unclear if it considered whether an individual domain name could also be
a document. 34 While a database is indeed a type of document, it would be
improper to consider each datum in the database a document of itself, just
as it would be improper to consider each word in an essay as an individual
document.A domain name is, in function, a single data point in the distributed
database that makes up the DNS.13 Thus, analogizing between a website
and a domain name on the basis of technological similarity is inappropriate.
These technological differences are not all that distinguish domain names
from websites. Their purposes and functions are entwined but completely
different. An analogy to a library call number and a book is also apt here. A
book contains information, and its primary purpose is to convey information
to its reader. This content is what makes a book valuable, no matter what that
content might be. A website is the same-websites are valuable only for the
information they provide to their audience. The purpose of the call number,
on the other hand, is to direct a reader to a certain book. The information
contained in the call number is aimed solely towards locating a certain book
among millions of others. A domain name serves the same purpose, in that
it directs a user towards information and the websites that convey it. Even
well-crafted domain names, such as freecreditscore.com, do not themselves
necessarily convey trustworthy information,"' but they only serve to direct
people to the websites where the information is located. This is why there
is such conflict over the use of trademarks as domain names. Without the
protections Congress put in place with ACPA, there would be no reason to
believe that a domain that used a famous mark is actually associated with
134 Kremen v. Cohen, 337 E 3 d I024, 1033-34 (9th Cir. 2003) ("We agree that the DNS is
a document (or perhaps more accurately a collection of documents). That it is stored in elec-
tronic form rather than on ink and paper is immaterial.") (citations omitted).
135 See Struve & Wagner, supra note 25, at io9.
136 A user has no guarantee that any given domain name is going to direct him or her to
a website with valuable information. Freecreditscore.com could take a user to a website with
information on obtaining a credit score for free, but it could as easily take the user to a website
on a completely unrelated topic, a phishing website, or it could lead nowhere.
201
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
the owner of that mark. Therefore, drawing an analogy between a website
and a domain name based on their purpose or function is also misleading.
The Paige court does not elaborate on how a domain name can be
"perceived by the senses.""' One can read a domain name in the location
bar of a web browser, but this alone is not enough to create a property
right, much less to create a tangible property right. One can read an IP
address in the same manner and IP addresses, like latitude and longitude
coordinates, are not property and cannot be owned.' The Margae court
did not elaborate on what it means for a website to be perceived by the
senses either. If one assumes, however, that "perceived by the senses"
means that one can view or listen to the content of a website, this is
another area where the analogy between a website and a domain name
breaks down. Perception of a website involves the transfer of knowledge
from the website to the viewer, whether that information is conveyed
in words, images, video, or sounds. There is no comparable transfer of
knowledge when a user reads a domain name. A user may associate
information with a domain; for instance, a user typing freecreditscore.com
into a web browser may expect to find a website that will provide his or
her credit score for free, but this is only an assumption on the user's part.
Until the user reaches the website in question, there is no actual transfer
of knowledge, and therefore, no "perception" in any meaningful sense.
For all of these reasons, the Paige court's determination that a domain
name is tangible property is not supported by the court's reasoning.
The only remaining argument that a domain name is property because
one can exclude others from access to it applies equally to tangible
and intangible property. The court relied on the Butner principle that a
bankruptcy court must defer to non-bankruptcy law, i.e., state property and
tort law, when determining a debtor's interests in property,13 9 as a reason
not to consider Umbro and Kremen in its analysis.'o A strict application
of Butner to the facts of Paige should have precluded finding a property
interest in the domain name based on the court's interpretation of Utah
law regarding the application of the Restatement's merger requirement.141
IV. PAIGE'S LOGIC is FLAWED, BUT THE COURT MAY HAVE REACHED THE
RIGHT CONCLUSION REGARDLESS
Despite the flaws in the Paigecourt's reasoning, its holding that a domain
name is tangible property is still potentially useful. There is a great deal of
137 Jubber v. Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. (In re Paige), 413 B.R. 882, 918 (Bankr. D. Utah
2009).
138 Ryan et al., supra note 20, at 340.
139 Butner v. United States, 44o U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
140 In re Paige, 413 B.R. at 917 n.169.
141 Seeid. at 917-18.
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scholarship on the exact legal status of domain names, but the claim that
a domain name could be tangible property seems to be truly novel. Most
courts that have considered the property implications of domain names
have assumed they are intangible without considering that there could be
a plausible alternative. This default assumption makes sense, as domain
names cannot be held, they cannot be touched, and they can be created with
a few keystrokes and a small registration fee, but that does not mean it is
correct. First, a domain name does not fit well into the doctrine of intangible
property as it has developed in equity. Second, the in rem provisions ofACPA
seem to treat a domain name as a type of tangible property. Finally, there is
a public policy argument that treating domain names as tangible property
would allow for a consistent application of laws among the several States.
A. A Domain Name Does Not Have the Characteristics of Intangible Property
A domain name is incorporeal, but this may be all that a domain name
has in common with most other forms of intangible property. Traditionally,
property rights were vested only in real property and in tangible personal
property.142 Such rights are sometimes referred to in property scholarship as
"usable wealth," 'a term meaning property that is "inherently exclusive and
physically useful."'" This usable wealth can be consumed, used, or traded
for other goods and services. At common law, there was a strong division
between property of this kind and obligations between individuals, which
were not seen as conveying a property interest on the parties involved. 145
Courts of equity blurred this line by allowing the assignment of personal
obligations, such as debts and corporate shares.146 Other courts extended
these intangible property interests to allow capitalization of future interests
in such obligations."14 Of course, only the benefit of these obligations was
practically assignable so the property interest in such assignments was held
to vest in the benefitted party rather than the burdened party.14 Courts
in equity also began allowing for division of rights in tangible property,
creating, for instance, assignable future interest rights in real property.'4 1
Thus, new forms of intangible property rights were created by pulling
142 Sarah Worthington, The Disappearing Divide Between Property and Obligation: The Impact
ofAligning Legal Analysis and Commercial Expectation, 42 TEX. INT'L L. J. 9 17, 920 (2007).
143 Id.
144 Noah M. Schottenstein, Note, Of Process and Product: Kremen v. Cohen and the
Consequences of Recognizing Property Rights in Domain Names, 14 VA. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2009).




149 See id. at 921.
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sticks from the bundle of existing tangible property rights.150
These circumstances surrounding the development of the intangible
property doctrine have given rise to defining characteristics that are
incompatible with domain names. Intangible property does not have
"intrinsic and marketable value" but is only representative of the value of
the obligation or information that it represents. 5 ' The value of intangible
property is not readily evident, nor is it easily ascertained. 5 2 Such property
is held in secret, in that existence and ownership of intangible property
is not obvious to others.'53 The situs of intangible property is wherever
the owner is located or domiciled.' These aspects of intangible property
are inherent in its character as assignable personal obligations or future
interests in real property.
Unlike things usually considered to be intangible property, "such as
certificates of stock, bonds, and promissory notes," 55 a domain name has
intrinsic value. The large secondary market in domain names' 5 6 and the
awesome damage awards in cases such as Kremen prove this. While stocks
are also primarily traded on a secondary market, the value of a share of
stock on the market is based upon the perceived value of its issuing
corporation. Domain names are independent of any entity. Their value
is not strictly reliant on a website that might be tied to a domain but is
solely invested in the domain name itself. Like a trademark, the domains
become invested with the good will of the public so that a successor to a
famous domain would benefit from using it, even if the successor's website
had nothing in common with the original. Sex.com, the domain at stake
in Kremen, was assigned to one website when Cohen controlled it, and to
another once Kremen recovered it, but its value remained the same.' Nor
is the value of a domain name in any way linked to the services provided
by the registrar or the TLD administrator. These services, which involve
the registry and distribution of the domain name through the DNS, are the
same for a valuable domain name such as freecreditscore.com as they are
for any other domain name one might register. The value is accrued and
vested in the domain name itself. In this respect, domain names have more
in common with chattels and other tangible property than they do with
150 Id.
151 In re Estate of Berman, 187 N.E.2d 541, 544 (III. App. Ct. 1963); see also Capital City
Country Club, Inc. v. Tucker, 613 SO.2d 448, 452 (Fla. 1993); Schottenstein, supra note 144.
152 Roth Drugs, Inc. v. Johnson, 57 P.2d 1o22, 1o28 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936).
153 Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, i99 U.S. 194, 205 (1905); Rounds &
Porter Lumber Co. v. Livesay, 66 F2d 298, 299 (ioth Cir. 1933).
154 Union Refrigerator, 199 U.S. at 205 (1905).
155 Berman, 187 N.E.2d at 544.
156 See Frakes, supra note 77.
157 The court in Kremen v. Cohen ordered only the transfer of the domain name, not the
website Cohen had created. See Kremen v. Cohen, 337 F3d 1024, 1027 (9th Cir. 2003).
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intangible property.
Unlike intangible property, a domain name is not held secretly. The
identity of the owner may not be obvious, but the fact that a domain name
is owned by someone is not secret. Tangible property cannot be held in
secret: the combined facts of its corporeal existence and an observer's
knowledge that he is not the owner indicate to any observer that such
property is either entirely un-owned, or must be owned by someone. It is
not at all apparent to an observer, however, that a given individual might
be the beneficiary of a debt or some other form of intangible property.
Because such property rights exist only between the parties involved, they
are not apparent to outsiders and are thus secret from the world at large.
A domain name is not held secretly in this sense. If a person attempts to
register a domain name that has already been registered, he will not be
permitted to register it.'"5 This denial indicates that the domain is owned
by another, even if it is not actively associated with a website. This aspect
of a domain name alone is more akin to tangible property than intangible
property. In addition to this, one can look up the owner of a domain
name in the same way one might look up the owner of real property in a
community's property records. Any person can perform a WHOIS search,
which searches through the records of registrars, to learn the identity and
contact information of a domain name's registered owner.'" Ownership of a
domain name is thus a public action, much like ownership of real property.
These comparisons demonstrate how much a domain name has in common
with tangible property and how different it is from intangible property.
B. ACPA Treats Domain Names as Tangible Property
ACPA allows for in rem actions against cybersquatters to establish
jurisdiction when the owner of the offending domain cannot be located.' 60
Under ACPA, "[in an in rem action ... a domain name shall be deemed
to have its situs in the judicial district in which the domain name registrar,
registry, or other domain name authority that registered or assigned the
domain name is located."is6 As in rem actions can be brought against
property, many courts have cited this provision of ACPA as evidence that
Congress intended domain names to be treated as a type of property.6 1
158 Registering Domain Names, NETWORK SOLUTIONs, http://www.networksolutions.com/
support/registering-domain-names (last visited Aug. 21, 20IO).
159 WHOIS Search for Domain Registration Information, NETWORK SOLUTIONs, http://wivw.
networksolutions.com/vhois/index.jsp (last visited Aug. 22, 2010). It is possible to hide this
information, but this is generally accomplished through a separate, paid service on behalf of
a registrar. Id.
i6o 15 U.S.C.A. § II2 5 (d)(2) (2oo9).
161 Id. § I I25(d)(2)(C)(i) (2009).
162 See, e.g., Porsche Cars N. Am., Inc. v. Porsche.Net, 302 F.3 d 248, 260 (4 th Cir. 2002).
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Congress did not have to provide in rem jurisdiction to allow actions
against cybersquatters.'63 Even before the enactment of ACPA, the Ninth
Circuit used the International Shoe standard to find the requisite minimum
contacts for exercise of personal jurisdiction over a cybersquatter who lived
outside the state.M The majority rule regarding minimum contacts for
cases involving the Internet is a purposeful direction test, which requires
that "the defendant'must have (1) committed an intentional act, which was
(2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) caused harm, the brunt of
which is suffered and which the defendant knows is likely to be suffered in
the forum state."'"6 ACPA defines a cybersquatter as one who in bad faith
"registers, traffics in, or uses a domain name that" is similar to an existing
mark,'" and it equates bad faith with intent.167 For a registrant to be found
to have registered a domain name in bad faith, the purposeful direction
test would necessarily have to be satisfied because the registrant's actions
would necessarily have to be intentional, expressly aimed at a trademark
owner, and motivated by a desire to draw internet traffic from the trademark
holder through consumer confusion, or to extort the trademark holder into
purchasing the domain name at a large markup. It was unnecessary for
Congress to provide an in rem action against cybersquatters themselves
because the requirements for personal jurisdiction over such individuals
are clearly met under the terms of the statute.
Congress specifically intended to legally separate a domain name from
its owner by providing for an in rem action against the domain. The Senate
Report that accompanied the passage of ACPA expressed Congress's intent
to deal with the problems that arise when a domain registrant cannot be
located:
A significant problem faced by trademark owners in the fight against
cybersquatting is the fact that many cybersquatters register domain
names under aliases or otherwise provide false information in their
registration applications in order to avoid identification and service of
process by the mark owner. The bill, as amended, will alleviate this
difficulty, while protecting the notions of fair play and substantial justice,
by enabling a mark owner to seek an injunction against the infringing
property in those cases where, after due diligence, a mark owner is unable
to proceed against the domain name registrant because the registrant has
provided false contact information and is not otherwise to be found."6
163 See Allen, supra note 34, at 297.
164 See Panavision Int'l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F3 d 1316, 1322 (9th Cir. 1998).
165 Pebble Beach Co. v. Caddy, 453 E3 d I 151, i15 6 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Bancroft &
Masters, Inc. v. Augusta Nat'l Inc., 223 F-3 d 1o82, 1o87 (9th Cir. 2000)).
166 § 1I2 5 (d)(I)(A).
167 See id. §II 25 (d)(i)(B)(ii).
168 S. REP. No. IO6-14o, at 1o (1999) (emphasis added). Congress's goal in providing for
an in rem action against a domain name itself was specifically to address the problem that
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Finally, ACPA, on its face, provides for in rem jurisdiction where the
registrar or registry, but not the owner, is located. The domain name, for
purposes of an in rem action, stays with the registrar, not with the buyer
or subsequent owner. This is a stark contrast to the classical conception
of intangible property, which provides that intangible property follows its
owner.' 6 9 A domain name has a definite location for jurisdictional purposes
under ACPA. A federal judge in Virginia recently ordered the transfer
of a domain name where the plaintiff was not only unable to serve the
defendant personally, but where the very identity of the defendant was
unknown.7 0 This exercise of in rem jurisdiction, where the owner of the
infringing domain was unknown but unimportant to the outcome of the
case, would be impossible to analogize to any common type of intangible
property, but is an accepted practice with regard to real property.'7'
Congress could have provided for a domain name to follow its owner
without disrupting the in rem jurisdiction of state courts. The Supreme
Court has held that a state's in rem jurisdiction applies to both tangible and
intangible property,17 2 and a state's inability to manually seize an intangible
right is not a bar to the exercise of in rem jurisdiction.' 3 Courts have
consistently been able to justify in rem actions against intangibles such as
stock, insurance policies, and other obligations.7 7 Against this background,
Congress had no need to provide any situs for a domain name in ACPA
because one could simply bring an in rem action against the domain name
itself without regard to where it is located, and a court could determine
proper jurisdictional issues and venue based on the parties involved. If
one assumes arguendo that Congress considered the application of in rem
jurisdiction to both tangible and intangible property when drafting ACPA,
then this stands as evidence that Congress intended domain names to be
treated like tangible property rather than intangible property.
arises when one cannot sue the cybersquatter himself. Accordingly, Congress intentionally
uncoupled the domain owner from the domain itself, to allow injured trademark holders "to
seek an injunction against the infringing property." Id. The report confirms that Congress, in
including the in rem provisions of ACPA, did not intend domain names to be treated under
the law as contractual agreements, but rather as some type of property.
169 See, e.g., Union Refrigerator Transit Co. v. Kentucky, 199 U.S. 194, 205 (905).
17o Dominion Enters. v. Dominionenterprisesco.com, No. i:o9-CV-634, 2010 WL
395951, at *2 (E.D. Va. Feb. 2,2010).
171 See, e.g., Combs v. Combs, 60 S.W.2d 368, 370 (Ky. 1933).
172 Pennington v. Fourth Nat'l Bank of Cincinnati, OhiO, 243 U.S. 269, 271 (1917) (hold-
ing that "[i]ndebtedness due from a resident to a nonresident" is property to which in rem
jurisdiction extends).
173 Thomas R. Lee, In Rem Jurisdiction in Cyberspace, 75 Wssi. L. REV. 97, 134 (2ooo) (cit-




C. Public Policy Encourages Domain Names to Be Treated as Tangible Property
to Ensure Consistent Application of Justice Among the Several States
The court in Paige was faced with a difficult decision. Under Utah
law, intangible property, which is not merged in a document, cannot be
converted."' But the facts clearly established that freecreditscore.com
had been effectively stolen from Paige's estate and used by Promarketing
and May.7 6 If the court followed the majority view that domain names
are intangible property, Paige's estate would be without a remedy, and
Promarketing and May would be free to profit from their ill-gotten gains.
The court chose to ignore precedent and held that the conversion action
was valid because a domain name is tangible property."' Though the
reasoning the court employed to justify this holding is flawed, it is easy to
understand why the court chose to find the way it did, as a matter of public
policy. Disagreements over the proprietary nature of domain names, in the
absence of binding authority, should not be allowed to stand in the way of
providing a remedy for an obvious wrong.
This is clearly the view taken by the court in Emke. In Emke, the
United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas chose to
apply California conversion law to a domain dispute, though the alleged
injury occurred in Texas, solely for public policy reasons.' Texas follows
the Restatement's merger requirement for intangible property."' If the court
did not apply California law, the differences in applications of tort law
among the several States could provide a safe harbor for clever domain
name abusers, defeating both equitable principles and Congress's intent in
federalizing the cybersquatting cause of action. Treating domain names as
tangible property eliminates this problem, while retaining all of the benefits
domain name owners enjoy in the regularization of rights and obligations
under the Kremen precedent. The Restatement's merger requirement does
not apply to tangible property; there are no logical gymnastics necessary
to find conversion of tangible property if the facts support such a claim. In
addition to buying and selling domain names, people regularly use them
in ways similar to the way they use tangible property, such as collateral for
loans.'" Holding domain names to be tangible property simplifies all of these
transactions and supports the uses to which domain names are put in practice.
175 Margae, Inc. v. Clear Link Techs., LLC, 620 F. Supp. 2d 1284, 1287 (D. Utah 2009).
176 See Jubber v. Search Mkt. Direct, Inc. (In re Paige), 413 B.R. 882, 896-98 (Bankr. D.
Utah 2009).
177 Id. at 918.
178 See Emke v. Compana, L.L.C., No. 3:o6-CV-14 16-L, 2007 WL 2781661, at #5 (N.D.
Tex. Sept. 25, 2007).
179 Id.
i8o Freeman, supra note 67, at 853.
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CONCLUSION
It is obvious from the myriad conflicts surrounding the issue of the legal
status of a domain name that existing property doctrines are ill-equipped
to address the Internet and the particular issues it brings before the courts.
These issues are far afield from what was conceived to be possible even fifty
years ago, yet courts persist in applying doctrines of law that are hundreds
of years old. As the district court in Kremen I wrote, "[it would be imprudent
for courts to] superimpos[e] the archaic principles governing the tort of
conversion onto the nebulous realm of the Internet.""" Until lawmakers
decide to create a new body of law to address these issues, courts will
continue to disagree as they are forced to apply archaic property concepts
to these new innovations. The general lack of agreement surrounding
applications of law to domain names only illustrates this need.
Treating domain names as if they are tangible property for purposes of
conversion and similar claims is a reasonable stop-gap in this jurisprudential
environment.Though thefitis not perfect,this approach is more advantageous
to both domain name owners and courts than treating domain names as
intangible property or as strictly contractual rights. The complexities of
the DNS and its related technologies are arguably beyond the expertise of
both the courts and juries, and the placement of domain names into a well-
understood classification simplifies these issues. Despite their incorporeal
nature, domain names have far more in common with tangible property
than intangible property, as the latter doctrine has developed over the past
century. This Note compared domain names repeatedly to different types
of real and personal property, and the comparison is apt: a domain name on
the Internet is like an object or a plot of land, in that it is obvious evidence
of owned property to outside observers and has intrinsic value regardless of
whether it has been developed or utilized. Congress also appears to endorse
this view of domain names as tangible property in ACPA, and the Utah
legislature, in passing the Utah E-Commerce Integrity Act, has followed
Congress's lead, which may be indicative of the trends of future legislation
in this area. And finally, treating domain names as tangible property makes
sense from a public policy standpoint, particularly in terms of enabling an
even application of law to domain names among the several States. Until
legislatures specifically address the issues and problems unique to the
Internet, courts should treat domain names as tangible property.
181 Kremen v. Cohen, 99 F. Supp. 2d I1 68, 174 (N.D. Cal. 2000).
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